censoredplanet.orgCensored Planet

× Read our latest paper on Russia’s network changes Paper About Team Media Projects Research Publications Reports Events Dashboard Data Raw Data Documentation Log InAbout Team Media Projects Research Publications Reports Events Dashboard Data Raw Data Documentation Log In© 2024 An Internet-wide, Longitudinal Censorship Observatory is a censorship measurement platform that collects data using multiple remote measurement techniques in more than 200 countries. Reports Data Publications Dashboard , in collaboration with Google Jigsaw , has developed a public dashboard for exploring processed data. Dashboard About News February 24, 2023 Read our USENIX 2023 paper on network changes after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 January 19, 2023 Join as a 2023 ICFP Fellow December 6, 2022 We release a new study on locating and examining network censorship devices Tweets by CensoredPlanetThe Observatory The Observatory uses remote measurement techniques such as Augur, Satellite, Qauck and Hyperquack to run remote censorship measurements for thousands of websites. These techniques use features in existing Internet protocols and infrastructure to interact with remote systems, using their responses to determine the presence or absence of censorship. Thus, we eliminate the need for accessible vantage points or volunteers in different countries, surpassing scale, coverage, continuity, and safety limitations. The observatory uses a modular design for measuring and analyzing Internet censorship. continously measures reachability to 2,000 websites from more than 95,000 vantage points in 221 countries (a 42-360% increase compared to other measurement platforms). also includes a rapid focus feature that can analyze certain censorship events in depth. finds increasing levels of censorship in 103 countries, and has detected more than 15 key censorship events. Paper Findings The Observatory The Observatory uses remote measurement techniques such as Augur, Satellite, Qauck and Hyperquack to run remote censorship measurements for thousands of websites. These techniques use features in existing Internet protocols and infrastructure to interact with remote systems, using their responses to determine the presence or absence of censorship. Thus, we eliminate the need for accessible vantage points or volunteers in different countries, surpassing scale, coverage, continuity, and safety limitations. The observatory uses a modular design for measuring and analyzing Internet censorship. continously measures reachability to 2,000 websites from more than 95,000 vantage points in 221 countries (a 42-360% increase compared to other measurement platforms). also includes a rapid focus feature that can analyze certain censorship events in depth. finds increasing levels of censorship in 103 countries, and has detected more than 15 key censorship events. Paper Findings Talks Protecting Users from Adversarial Networks MADWeb 2023 Community Webinar 2021 Community Webinar : An Internet-wide, Longitudinal Censorship Observatory ACM SIGCSAC CCS 2020: Measuring Internet censorship remotely Internet Measurement Village 2020 : exposing internet censorship worldwide Michigan EngineeringData All the data collected from the Observatory is publicly available Raw Data Compressed files containing JSON data (1 file per scan per technique). Documentation Documentation about and data formats. Dashboard Explore data through our interactive dashboard. Latest Reports Our research publications are often technical and complex, here we aim to communicate our research to a broader audience. All Reports CERTainty: Detecting DNS Manipulation at Scale using TLS Certificates We developed a novel technique, *CERTainty*, to detect DNS manipulation by utilizing a widely adopted trusted infrastructure: TLS certificates. Read Report Locating and Examining Censorship Devices We release novel network measurement methods for locating and examining censorship devices Read Report TSPU: Russia’s Decentralized Censorship System We measured Russia’s new TSPU censorship system, which empowers the Russian government to unilaterally roll out information control measures. Read Report OpenVPN is Open to VPN Fingerprinting We identified OpenVPN’s fingerprinting vulnerabilities and tested them with a real-world ISP Read Report Latest Reports Our research publications are often technical and complex, here we aim to communicate our research to a broader audience. All Reports CERTainty: Detecting DNS Manipulation at Scale using TLS Certificates We developed a novel technique, *CERTainty*, to detect DNS manipulation by utilizing a widely adopted trusted infrastructure: TLS certificates. Read Report Locating and Examining Censorship Devices We release novel network measurement methods for locating and examining censorship devices Read Report TSPU: Russia’s Decentralized Censorship System We measured Russia’s new TSPU censorship system, which empowers the Russian government to unilaterally roll out information control measures. Read Report OpenVPN is Open to VPN Fingerprinting We identified OpenVPN’s fingerprinting vulnerabilities and tested them with a real-world ISP Read Report Call for Students We are always looking for promising students (computer science, political science, journalism) and developers to join our team! Get Involved Call for Students We are always looking for promising students (CS, political science, journalism) and developers to join our team! Get Involved Featured Publications All Publications August 2024 USENIX Security Fingerprinting Obfuscated Proxy Traffic with Encapsulated TLS Handshakes Diwen Xue Michalis Kallitsis Amir Houmansadr Roya Ensafi BibTex @inproceedings {Xue2024TLS, author = {Diwen Xue and Michalis Kallitsis and Amir Houmansadr and Roya Ensafi}, title = {{Fingerprinting Obfuscated Proxy Traffic with Encapsulated TLS Handshakes}}, booktitle = {33st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 24)}, year = {2024}, address = {Philadelphia, PA}, publisher = {USENIX Association}, } August 2023 Usenix Security Symposium 2023 Network Responses to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: A Cautionary Tale for Internet Freedom Reethika Ramesh Ram Sundara Raman Apurva Virkud Alexandra Dirksen Armin Huremagic David Fifield Dirk Rodenburg Rod Hynes Doug Madory Roya Ensafi BibTex PDF @inproceedings{ramesh2023network, title = {{Network Responses to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: A Cautionary Tale for Internet Freedom}}, author = {Ramesh, Reethika and Sundara Raman, Ram and Virkud, Apurva and Dirksen, Alexandra and Huremagic, Armin and Fifield, David and Rodenburg, Dirk and Hynes, Rod and Madory, Doug and Ensafi, Roya}, booktitle = {32nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 23)}, year = {2023}, address = {Anaheim, CA}, publisher = {USENIX Association} } July 2023 Free and Open Communications on the Internet The Use of Push Notification in Censorship Circumvention Diwen Xue Roya Ensafi BibTex PDF @inproceedings{Xue2023PUSH, author = {Diwen Xue and Roya Ensafi}, title = {{The Use of Push Notification in Censorship Circumvention}}, booktitle = {Free and Open Communications on the Internet}, year = {2023}, address = {Lausanne, Switzerland}, publisher = {Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies} } July 2023 Privacy Enhancing Technology Symposium CERTainty: Detecting DNS Manipulation using TLS Certificates Elisa Tsai Deepak Kumar Ram Sundara Raman Gavin Li Yael Eiger Roya Ensafi BibTex PDF @inproceedings{tsai2023detecting, title = {CERTainty: Detecting DNS Manipulation using TLS Certificates}, author = {Tsai, Elisa and Kumar, Deepak and Sundara Raman, Ram and Li, Gavin and Eiger, Yael and Ensafi, Roya}, booktitle={Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS)}, year={2023} } February 2023 Free and Open Communications on the Internet (FOCI) 2023 Advancing the Art of Censorship Data Analysis Ram Sundara Raman Apurva Virkud Sarah Laplante Vinicius Fortuna Roya Ensafi BibTex PDF...